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Abstract 
A cross-sectional relationship between price dispersion among Russian regions and per 
capita income dispersion is used to measure the degree of integration between regional 
commodity markets. The sequence of cross-sectional estimations for each month of the 
period spanning 1992 through 2000 provides the temporal pattern of market integration in 
Russia, yielding an integration trajectory. This pattern suggests that the regional 
fragmentation of the national market had been increasing during the early years of transition, 
and then (since about the end of 1994) integration was tending – in general – to improve. 
However, substantial fluctuations occur in the movement to more integration. Difficult-to-
access regions markedly contribute to the overall disconnectedness of regional markets; 
controlling for these regions, the pattern becomes more encouraging. Surprisingly, the 
European part of Russia turns out to be less integrated than its Asian part. A number of 
culprits behind market fragmentation are found, organized crime among them. 
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1. Introduction 
The spatial behavior of prices in Russia has been dramatically changing in the course of 
transition. After the price-liberalization shock of 1992, prices sharply diverged across regions 
of the country, so indicating progressive regional fragmentation of the national market (see, 
e.g., Koen and Phillips, 1992). But in due course they started movement in the opposite 
direction. Considering price data for 1994, De Masi and Koen (1996) find the Russian market 
to be weakly integrated; however, the degree of integration seems to them to have increased 
by that time since 1992. In a more recent paper, Koen and de Masi (1997) state that price 
convergence across regions within a country over time is one of the stylized facts observed 
in most transitional economies. 
Nevertheless, the pattern is rather erratic, since, on the other hand, there is abundant 
evidence that forces counteracting market integration – specifically, regional protectionism – 
are strong enough. And so, the resulting tendency is vague. The aim of this paper is to obtain 
an evolving pattern of Russia’s market integration from the beginning of the price 
liberalization till recent years. 
To achieve this aim, a cross-sectional relationship between commodity price dispersion and 
demand dispersion (represented by per capita income dispersion) across Russian regions in 
some point in time is used. If the law of one price holds, i.e., the market is integrated, then a 
regional price should depend on the overall demand in the national market rather than on the 
local demand. Hence, controlling for transportation costs (proxied by inter-regional 
distances), this relationship should be statistically insignificant. Otherwise the strength of the 
relationship indicates the extent of deviation of the national market from complete 
integration. Running cross-sectional estimations for each available time point, an integration 
trajectory (i.e., a time series of the integration measure) is obtained, thus providing the 
temporal pattern of market integration. The cost of a uniform basket of basic food goods is 
used as a commodity price index. The data cover 74 regions in Russia, and span the period 
February 1992 through December 2000 with monthly frequency. 
The results obtained suggest that regional fragmentation of the Russian market had been 
sharply increasing during the early years of transition, and then (since about the end of 
1994) integration was tending – in general – to improve. However, substantial fluctuations 
occur in the movement to more integration. Using quite different methodology, Berkowitz and 
DeJong (2001) find a similar pattern of fluctuations during 1995 through 1999, the period 
covered by their analysis (a comparison is provided below in Section 6). Difficult-to-access 
regions markedly contribute to the overall disconnectedness of regional markets; controlling 
for these regions, the pattern becomes more encouraging. Surprisingly, the European part of 
Russia (without its northern territories) turns out to be less integrated than Siberia and Far 
East excluding difficult-to-access regions. 
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The issue of market integration in contemporary Russia has been the subject of a number of 
studies. Gardner and Brooks (1994), De Masi and Koen (1996), and Goodwin et al. (1999) 
examined the early stage of transition. They found large price differences across locations 
that could not be assigned to transportation costs. At the same time, some indications were 
obtained that these differences tended to decrease. Covered a more long time span, results 
by Berkowitz et al. (1998) are resembling, indicating poor market integration in Russia as 
well, but they are somewhat better. More recently, Berkowitz and DeJong (1999) found a 
culprit behind the market fragmentation, the so-called Red Belt (a group of anti-reform 
regions). Gluschenko (2001a, 2002b) analyzed cointegration and threshold relationships for 
location pairs; the first study involved regions of Western Siberia (data spanning 1994-1998), 
and the second covered entire Russia (data spanning 1994-2001) with regions aggregated 
to economic territories, ekonomicheskiy rayon. The patterns obtained were mixed; both 
integrated and non-integrated location pairs were found, thus evidencing that the Russian 
market is not near to being completely integrated. 
The papers cited use the same methodologies that are applied to spatially dispersed markets 
within countries with advanced market economies (see, e.g., Parsley and Wei, 1996; Engel 
and Rogers, 1996; Obstfeld and Taylor, 1997). A feature of these methodologies is that they 
yield estimates which average, in some sense, the price behavior over the entire period. 
Therefore the pattern of integration turns out to be static even though raw data are time 
series. This is of little importance if the case in hands is a stable economy, where the nature 
of price behavior does not sufficiently change with time. But it is in a transitional economy 
where such changes are to be expected. And they hold the greatest interest, characterizing 
the transitional process itself. This paper focuses just on changes in Russia’s market 
integration rather than on its “temporally aggregated” state. 
2. Measuring market integration 
As it immediately follows from the law of one price, in a perfectly integrated economy, a 
regional price of a (tradable) good is determined in the national market, and does not depend 
on local demand. If the quantity demanded in the region increases or decreases (due to, 
e.g., changes in regional per capita income), then arbitrageurs adjust the quantity supplied 
by moving the good to or from the region. This implies that the supply curve is absolutely 
elastic, pr(qr) = p
* (= const), where pr is the price of the good in region r, qr is the quantity 
supplied, and p* is the national-market price, i.e., just the “one price”. 
To take it more formally, let us assume the income per capita, ir, to be the only (in addition to 
price) determinant of demand, qr = D(pr, ir), and let qr = S(pr) be the supply function. The 
regional price, pr, is a solution of the equilibrium equation D(pr, ir) = S(pr); hence, pr = f(ir). 
This function f(ir) can be represented as kir
b (in particular, assuming the elasticity of demand 
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on income to be constant). For convenience, the logarithmic representation is hereafter 
used, uppercase letters denoting logarithms of variables written in lowercase, e.g., Pr = ln pr. 
Then 
Pr = K + bIr.         (1) 
Since, by the law of one price, Pr is always equal to P
*, it cannot depend on Ir; hence, b = 0 
should hold. Or, in econometric terms, allowing for random disturbances in the right -hand 
side of (1), b should be statistically insignificant. 
Subtracting Equation (1) for some region s from that for r, the relationship rearranges to an 
equation in terms of percentage differentials (Prs º Pr – Ps = ln(pr/ps); similarly for income): 
Prs = bIrs.         (2) 
In this equation, the equality of b to zero becomes quite obvious as it should be Prs = 0 under 
the law of one price. 
Hence, relationship (1) or (2) can be used as a cross-sectional test for the law of one price. If  
b = 0 holds over a set {r} (or a pairwise set {(r, s)}), then the relevant market can be deemed 
as integrated. A non-zero value of b (it is easily proved that b should be positive in such a 
case) is a sign that regional markets are not perfectly integrated. Being the elasticity of price 
dispersion on income dispersion in Equation (2), the magnitude of b can be used as a 
measure of the degree of market integration; the higher b, the weaker integration (thus, in 
fact, b measures market fragmentation).1  
In essence, the right-hand side of (2) evaluates the overall height of barriers to trade 
between regions r and s. Let Crs represent costs needed to move a unit of the good from s to 
r (Crs º ln(1 + crs), crs being arbitrage transaction costs expressed as a percentage of  pr). 
Then     Pr = Ps + Crs, and Prs = Crs. Assume that some components of Crs are quantifiable, 
thus providing an (unknown) portion q£1 of the overall value of transaction costs. If the right-
hand side of  (2) is augmented for qCrs, the value of b decreases, since (1 – q)Crs = bIrs with 
this. In the case that transaction costs are fully identified, that is q = 1, we get b = 0. 
This provides a helpful framework for analyzing importance of various trading frictions at all. 
But one of them, the segmentation of markets by physical distance, is to be taken into 
account in all instances. The point is that the perfect integration is far from the case in the 
                                                 
1 It is worth of note that b  = 0 is a necessary condition for the law of one price to hold, but it is not a sufficient 
condition. The point is that there may be forces causing regional prices to deviate from the equality regardless of 
local demands (incomes); sale taxes varying across regions provide an example. 
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reality; e.g., Engel and Rogers (1996) as well as Parsley and Wei (1996) find price 
dispersion among US cities to depend strongly on distance. And so, it is reasonable to 
accept a more realistic benchmark of integration, allowing for “natural”, irremovable 
impediments to inter-regional trade such as physical distances.2 That is, an economy is 
deemed to be (realistic) integrated if there are no “artificial” impediments only in it. Thus, the 
degree of integration, b, will be measured with arbitrage transaction costs reduced by 
transportation costs. 
By assuming transportation costs to be log-linear function of distance, rs
T
rs LC g+a=
)( , the 
following equation is arrived at: 
Prs = a + bIrs + gLrs,        (3) 
where Lrs º lnlrs; lrs is distance separating regions r and s. If arbitrage transaction costs are 
nothing but costs of shipping goods, i.e., rs
T
rs CC =
)( , then it will be b = 0, and the market is 
recognized as integrated. 
A caveat is that the price differential, Prs, may pick up, along with the effect of impediments to 
trade, variations in income-dependent costs of non-traded component of the good. Costs of 
marketing and distribution in sale prices are meant. Since these services are highly labor-
intensive, their costs depend strongly on local wages in retail trade, and the wages, in turn, 
may be highly correlated with local per capita income. Then b would capture a mixture of 
both the effects. There are two possible ways to deal with this problem. The first is to 
interpret the difference in distribution costs as an additional indication of imperfect 
integration. In fact, this means extending the notion of market integration. That is, b will 
measure not only integration of the commodity market as such, but also integration of the 
market for distribution services and that of the retail-trade labor market.3 The second way is 
to explicitly take into account differences in distribution costs, supplementing the right -hand 
side of (3) with a relevant variable, or eliminating these costs from raw prices used to 
calculate Prs. 
Unfortunately, the latter way is not easy to follow, as statistical data on distribution costs or 
retail-wholesale margins are rather poor (not only in Russia, in other countries as well). That 
is why the first approach is used in this paper. Luckily, the effect of non-tradable inputs is not 
fundamental (at least, for Russia) as it follows from a below-presented comparison of 
estimations with and without distribution costs that are available on yearly base.  
                                                 
2 In the case of Russia, there is one more “natural” impediment, namely, difficult access to a number of regions; see 
the next section. 
3 Such a generalization is quite meaningful, since distribution costs may not all be location-specific. For example, 
this is the case when there are nation-wide department store chains and corporations’ distribution networks. 
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3. Data and econometrics 
A price index used for statistical analysis is the cost of the basket of 25 basic food goods 
accepted as standard by the Russian statistical agency, Goskomstat, during January 1997 
through June 2000. Appendix Table A-1 provides the composition and the structure of the 
basket. The data are monthly, spanning the period February 1992 through December 2000 
(107 months). They were obtained directly from Goskomstat’s office (the index before 1997 
was computed there to author’s order; as for July to December 2000, Goskomstat still 
continued calculating this index though did not already publish it). The price data are for 
capital cities of Russian regions while income data are for regions; incomes are drawn from 
monthly statistical bulletin “Social and Economic Situation of Russia” for 1992-2000. 
The basic spatial sample covers 74 regions in Russia (of all the 89). The data are lacking for 
10 autonomous okrugs, Chechen Republic, Republic of Ingushetia, and the Jewish 
Autonomous Oblast. Besides that, the Moscow Oblast and the Leningrad Oblast are omitted 
because their capital cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg, are at the same time separate 
subjects of the Russian Federation reckoned among the 89 regions. Distances are mostly 
railroad ones except for a few for regions having no railway communication (highway, river or 
sea distance is taken in such a case).4 
To estimate market integration at a time point (month) t, an econometric version of Equation 
(3) is used, 
Prs(t) = a(t) + b(t)Irs(t) + g(t)Lrs + ers(t),     (r, s)ÎPÌ{1,…,N}
2,    (4) 
where ers(t) is an error term, and N is the number of regions. Regression (4) is estimated 
over a set P of dissimilar pairs of regions, that is, either pair (r, s ) or (s, r) is included for 
given r and s; r ¹ s. For simplicity, let this set be such that for each its pair Prs(t) ³ 0. 
Equation (4) is a cross-sectional regression. Running it sequentially for each available point 
in time, a time series of the integration measure is obtained, b(t) for t = 1992:02,…,2000:12, 
which provides the pattern of changes in integration during the period covered. 
The basic spatial sample, hereafter referred to as “entire Russia”, yields 2,701 (= 74´73/2) 
region pairs. Besides that, estimations are run over two more samples that are subsamples 
of the basic sample.  
One of them represents Russia excluding difficult-to-access regions. This sample includes 
69 regions generating 2,346 pairs. Excluded are the Murmansk Oblast, Republic of Sakha 
                                                 
4 The distance matrix was compiled by Alexei Abramov, Novosibirsk State University. 
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(Yakutia), the Sakhalin Oblast, the Magadan Oblast, and the Kamchatka Oblast. They are 
remote regions lacking (except the Murmansk Oblast) railway and highway communication 
with other regions. Due to this, arbitrage can hardly be bilateral there, goods being imported 
only to these regions. Obviously, difficult access to a number of regions worsens integration 
of the national market. And so, eliminating such regions is equivalent to controlling for this 
“natural” impediment to integration. 
Another sample represents the European part of Russia excluding its northern territories; it is 
hereafter referred to as simply “European Russia”. There are 51 regions in the sample, 
hence 1,275 region pairs. Since the transport infrastructure is more developed in this part of 
the country, and distances are shorter, one might a priori believe European Russia to be 
more integrated than the remainder of the country without difficult-to-access regions. 
Therefore it is interesting to verify whether such a belief is true. 
There are missed observations on prices pr in the time series used. The gaps in the price 
data are especially numerous in the initial portion of the period covered, 1992-1994. For 
some months, data are lacking for up to 15 regions, reducing 1.6-fold the number of region 
pairs. To fill the gaps, missed prices are approximated, using regional monthly CPI-food. The 
interpolated value of pr(t) is the arithmetic mean of the nearest known preceding price 
inflated (through the chain method) to the required time point, t, and the nearest known 
succeeding price deflated to t. Let prices at t – m and t + n be known, and pr(t) be CPI-food 
for month t in region r (pr(t) = ),1(/)( -tt rr pp where )(×rp  is the overall level of prices 
for foodstuffs). Then the interpolated price is computed as 
).
)1(...)1()(
)(
)(...)2()1()((
2
1
)(
+××-+×+
+
+××+-×+-×-=
tntnt
ntp
tmtmtmtptp
rrr
r
rrrrr ppp
ppp
(5) 
For example, if an observation for one month is missed, its restored value looks like pr(t) = 
(pr(t–1)×pr(t) + pr(t+1)/ pr(t+1))/2. 
4. Temporal pattern of integration 
 Having been obtained for each of 107 months, the results are too cumbersome to be 
tabulated. For this reason they are mostly presented in graphic form. At first it is useful to 
look at the evolution of inter-regional price volatility. Figure 1 plots standard deviations over 
region pairs of the price differential for each time point, s(t) = s(Prs(t)), and for the three 
region samples. Being calculated over a set of dissimilar region pairs, P, s(t) would depend 
on choice of P that is arbitrary (averaging over various P produces different means, hence, 
standard deviations). To avoid such an ambiguity, the standard deviations in Figure 1 are 
calculated over the full set of region pairs, i.e., including both (r, s) and (s, r); in the case of 
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entire Russia, this set contains N(N – 1) pairs. Since Psr = – Prs, the mean over such set of 
the price differential always is zero.5 
From Figure 1 it is seen that the inter-regional volatility of prices was rising during the early 
years of the transition, and then it was almost permanently declining. Judging from this 
indirect evidence, one might expect a resembling dynamics of market integration – its 
deterioration in the initial stage of the market transformation, and its improvement with time 
after that. The price volatility over European Russia almost always is less than over other 
region samples. This seemingly corroborates the hypothesis of better integration in this part 
of the country. For comparison, appendix Figure A-1 reports inter-regional volatility of 
incomes. 
Let us turn now to the regression results. They are listed in appendix Table A-2. Figure 2 
reports point estimates of b(t) for various region samples. Recall that b actually measures 
the degree of segmentation of a market, i.e., the zero level corresponds to complete 
integration, and the higher b, the lower integration. Appendix Figure A-2 plots estimates of 
g(t), and Figure A -3 plots the R2 statistic for the regressions reported. 
                                                 
5 Thus, the standard deviations plotted differ from those of the endogenous variable in the regressions. However, 
the difference is in numerical values rather than in the behavior of s(t) with time. Being plotted, s(t) over the actually 
used sets of pairs produces curves having almost the same shapes like in Figure 1. 
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For entire Russia, all estimates of b are highly statistically significant, having p-values less 
than 0.001; the same is true for distance. An exception is three estimates with slightly higher 
p-values, 0.002 to 0.006. Except for 1992:02, where b is insignificant, and 1993:03, where its 
p-value equals 0.029, b for Russia excluding difficult-of-access regions is significant at the 
0.1-percent level as well. There are two points in time where distance is insignificant over 
this sample  (1992:03 and 1992:07). The remaining estimates of g are significant at the 0.1-
percent level except for the three with the 5-percent significance and one (1992:02) with the 
10-percent significance. For European Russia, there are four insignificant estimates of b in 
the initial part of the period (in 1992:02, 1992:03, 1993:02, and 1993:05), and four estimates 
are negative (in 1992:02, 1992:09, 1993:01, and 1993:03), of which three are significant. All 
remaining estimates of b but a few ones are significant at the 0.1-percent level. As for the 
coefficient on distance, it is rather small over European Russia, and not infrequently it 
becomes insignificant. Of all the 107 estimates of g, 30 are insignificant, 9 are significant at 
the 10-percent level, 12 are significant at the 5-percent level, and the rest are significant at 
the 1-percent level (mostly, at the 0.1-percent level). Interestingly, beginning from 1998:12, 
distance becomes almost permanently insignificant in European Russia. 
During the early years following the price liberalization, fragmentation of the Russian market 
was sharply increasing. In fact, the market was changing into a collection of loosely bound 
regional markets. However, caution is required in the interpretation of results for the very 
initial part of that period, the first few months of 1992. It is unlikely that the rise of b at that 
time reflects deterioration of market integration. Judging from the value of b, the Russian 
market was almost “perfectly integrated” at the starting point, the beginning of 1992. With 
centralized pricing, prices, indeed, in no way depend on demand; hence we will inevitably 
obtain b = 0. But this bears no relation to market integration; the notion itself is meaningless 
in such a situation, as there is no market at all. And the price liberalization did proceed 
gradually to some extent. Namely, for a number of goods, the freedom of pricing was 
restricted to certain limits that were subsequently widened or removed; for details, see 
Frenkel’ (1997) and Serova (2000). This concerns basic goods, many of which just enter into 
the basket of 25 food goods. Moreover, neither producers nor wholesale and retail traders 
initially had experience of pricing on their own, and this might cause rather weak (if any) 
linkage between prices and demand. 
Turning back to Figure 1, we see that the inter-regional volatility of prices was not too low in 
the first months of 1992. But the regression results indicate weak or no dependence of price 
dispersion on distance in these months. Hence, the law of one price hardly held, even being 
treated accurate to transportation costs. It seems likely that it is just the case mentioned in 
the footnote 1, where price dispersion is caused mostly by various accidental reasons 
exhibiting no any regularity, and so, violation of the law cannot be captured or is understated 
by the regression implemented. 
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Probably, the fast rise of b (strengthening dependence of prices on local demand) in the 
early months of the market reforms was induced by the adaptation of sellers to market 
pricing and by widening its scope. But the possibility itself of such a dependence results from 
weakness of inter-regional trade relations, which keeps price disparities from elimination. 
Thus the beginning of the integration trajectories provides only indirect evidence that the 
degree of integration of the Russian market was low at that time, but it gives no idea of the 
actual value of this degree. Thereafter the value of b was being progressively more 
determined by the magnitude of impediments to inter-regional trade, while the component 
conditioned by the transition from planned to market pricing was gradually decreasing in 
importance until vanished at all. There is no way to recognize how long time this component 
existed and what was its contribution to the value of b at particular points in time. It may be 
only supposed, based upon observations of the reality of that time, that as early as mid-1993 
its role, probably, was of little importance.  
And so, subsequent values of b entirely owe their rise to increasing economic isolation of 
regions. In the early years of the transition, there were only embryos of market institutions, 
hence prerequisites to inter-regional arbitrage were simply lacking. The overwhelming share 
of both retail and wholesale trade still remained to be state-run, having neither the stimuli nor 
the possibilities for arbitrage. There were private firms and individuals that did practice 
spatial commodity arbitrage, but these were very small firms at that time, and their 
contribution to the total volume of trade was minor. Trade flows between regions were 
chaotic, accidental bargains prevailing (the more so as information on arbitrage opportunities 
was almost entirely lacking). Regional authorities were contributing largely to economic 
separation of regions, aiming to cushion price shocks in their own regions. Numerous 
regional programs of the “food security” (that is, the self-provision of a given region with 
foodstuffs) were developed in the early years of the reforms, so pushing regions to the 
autarky. 
Segmentation of the Russian market peaked in 1993-1994. However, by 1994, a foundation 
of market institutions in the Russian consumer market apparently came into being. And as 
market institutions were forming, wholesale and retail trade were being privatized, market 
infrastructure was developing, and “market mentality” was strengthening, the arbitrage 
activity was broadening. As a result, the improvement in market integration started from the 
end of 1994. This tendency remains valid till the very end of the covered period. In the last 
two years, 1999-2000, the value of b ranges between 0.10 and 0.13 for entire Russia, and 
between 0.05 and 0.07 for Russia without difficult-to-access regions. 
At the same time, deviations from this tendency occur. For example, a fluctuation in the 
second half of 1995 was caused, probably, by a new wave of administrative trade barriers. 
They were local restrictions on exportation products outside regions, aiming to force 
agricultural firms located in a given region to pay debts to the regional budget (Serova, 
2000). One more peak is induced by the financial crisis in August 1988. Interestingly, this 
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peak is clear on the trajectories for Russia excluding difficult-to-access regions and 
European Russia, but it is not seen on the trajectory for entire Russia. 
Returning to the early years of the transition, two time intervals of a sufficient improvement in 
integration are seen, approximately first halves of 1993 and 1994. They roughly correspond 
to the intervals when the rise in food prices reduced dramatically (for example, from 29.0% in 
January 1993 to 16.1 in April 1993). Some changes in integration in those years might be 
assigned to variations in speed of change in the US dollar/ruble exchange rate. Appendix 
Figure A-4 gives an illustration. However, the relation between changes in integration and 
changes in inflation (as to foodstuffs) is far from unambiguous (the more so for the 
dollar/ruble exchange rate). Besides that, it is unclear what is the cause and what is the 
effect – whether inflation affects the integration or vice versa. Overall, the general view of the 
integration trajectories provides an impression of undulatory changes with yearly waves 
having the crest in the second half of a year, and the trough in the first half. Are there some 
regular reasons behind this, or is it nothing more than an accidental coincidence, that is the 
open question.   
From comparison of the integration trajectories for Russia with and without difficult-to-access 
regions, it is apparent that these regions account for a significant share of the overall 
disconnectedness of regional markets in Russia. Eliminating these regions, the value of b is 
approximately halved. Due to existence of regions with difficult access to them, the Russian 
market cannot become completely integrated during any foreseeable time, be the Russian 
economy as advanced market economy as wished.  Hence, this geographical feature of the 
country should be taken into account while comparing integration in Russia with that in 
established market economies. 
Another comparison involves Russia excluding difficult-to-access regions and the European 
part of the country without northern territories of this part. As mentioned above, European 
Russia might be expected to be more integrated. But surprisingly, this is not the case. Since 
the second half of 1995, values of b are permanently higher here than in Russia without 
difficult-to-excess regions, up to almost two times in 2000, when they are very close to the 
values for entire Russia. This implies that the market of European Russia is, vice versa, less 
integrated than the market of Siberia and Far East (excluding Yakutia, Sakhalin, Kamchatka, 
and the Magadan Oblast). Indeed, not reported estimates of b for the latter are almost all 
insignificant since December 1998, suggesting that the relevant part of the national market is 
completely integrated in the last two years. Taking into consideration long distances between 
regions and relatively poor transport infrastructure there, this result is quite unexpected. 
One of culprits behind weakening market integration in European Russia is the Moscow 
market. There is abundant evidence that sellers from other regions have no freedom of entry 
into this market; almost insurmountable barrier is erected here by both local “mafias” and the 
Moscow government – see, e.g., Berkowitz et al. (1998). Controlling for this culprit, values of 
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b fall dramatically while values of g rise (so indicating that transportation costs do matter in 
the European part of Russia). For example, b decreases 1.3 to 2.6-fold in 2000, and g 
increases 1.3 up to 8-fold. Nevertheless, in so doing bs do not become insignificant, still 
exceeding those for Asian Russia without its difficult-to-excess regions. Appendix Figure A-5, 
(a) and (b), gives an idea of impact of the Moscow market on estimates of b and g for 
European Russia as well as a comparison with the values for Asian Russia. 
As pointed out in Section 3, a portion of the price data consists of approximated values. To 
verify whether this considerably affects the behavior of the trajectories, regression (4) was 
also estimated over the source data set with gaps. This yielded only minor quantitative 
changes in the estimation results, and the trajectories remained to qualitatively be almost the 
same. As an illustration Figure 2 provides a comparison of trajectories for entire Russia 
obtained with and without filling the data gaps; appendix Figure A-6 does this for the rest two 
subsamples. Besides the CPI-based method of restoring missed observations by Formula 
(5), the linear interpolation was also tried. This method did not produce sufficient changes as 
well. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Integration trajectories
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5. Role of the Non-traded Component 
Another issue to be verified is that of the part played by the non-tradable component of 
goods in integration measure b. Data on regional wholesale prices for individual goods (and 
cost of the 25-item basket) as well as on structure of individual retail prices are not available. 
However, the Russian statistics observes aggregated trade indicators which can be used as 
proxies. These are trading costs relative to retail sales, and the net revenue calculated as the 
difference of sale proceeds and purchase value of goods; the indicators are computed over 
large and medium shops by region. If for no other reason than these indicators cover both 
foods and industrial goods, they provide very rough approximation for the food basket used. 
Nevertheless, they work. Both the indicators were tried, the first as a proxy of distribution 
costs, and the second as a proxy of retail-wholesale margin, having yielded similar results. 
And so, only the former is considered below, being denoted dr. The sources of the data are 
Goskomstat (1996b) and Goskomstat (1998). The data for 1992 and 1998-2000 are lacking; 
values of dr for 1997 are extended to 1998-2000.
6 
Taking into account (percentage) distribution costs, the spatial equilibrium condition 
becomes: 
pr(1 – dr) = ps(1 – ds)(1 + crs).        (6) 
                                                 
6 For these years, Goskomstat of Russia published the both indicators in monetary terms only without providing 
retail sales over large and medium shops to calculate the percentage. 
 
Figure 3. Impact of filling the data gaps on the trajectory for entire Russia 
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Table 1. Impact of distribution costs on estimates of the integration measure  
Year Variable Entire Russia Excluding difficult-to-access regions European Russia 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 
1992 
Income 0.141*** 
(0.008) NA 
0.078*** 
(0.008) NA 
0.034*** 
(0.013) NA 
 Distance 0.032*** 
(0.003)  
0.013*** 
(0.003)  
0.015*** 
(0.005)  
 Income 0.203*** 
(0.010) 
0.171*** 
(0.010) 
0.087*** 
(0.009) 
0.084*** 
(0.009) 
0.065*** 
(0.015) 
0.067*** 
(0.015) 
1993 Distance 0.077*** 
(0.004) 
0.064*** 
(0.004) 
0.050*** 
(0.004) 
0.047*** 
(0.004) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
 DC  0.364*** 
(0.034) 
 0.120*** 
(0.039) 
 
 
0.101 
(0.082) 
 Income 0.265*** 
(0.009) 
0.242*** 
(0.009) 
0.124*** 
(0.007) 
0.121*** 
(0.007) 
0.130*** 
(0.009) 
0.133*** 
(0.009) 
1994 Distance 0.123*** 
(0.004) 
0.109*** 
(0.004) 
0.077*** 
(0.004) 
0.072*** 
(0.004) 
0.024*** 
(0.004) 
0.024*** 
(0.004) 
 DC  0.250*** 
(0.017) 
 0.138*** 
(0.023) 
 
 
0.107*** 
(0.035) 
 Income 0.201*** 
(0.007) 
0.175*** 
(0.006) 
0.125*** 
(0.006) 
0.122*** 
(0.006) 
0.135*** 
(0.007) 
0.134*** 
(0.007) 
1995 Distance 0.110*** 
(0.003) 
0.080*** 
(0.003) 
0.073*** 
(0.003) 
0.065*** 
(0.003) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
 DC  0.501*** 
(0.025) 
 0.230*** 
(0.029) 
 
 
-0.051 
(0.045) 
 Income 0.161*** 
(0.007) 
0.143*** 
(0.007) 
0.075*** 
(0.005) 
0.076*** 
(0.006) 
0.096*** 
(0.005) 
0.111*** 
(0.006) 
1996 Distance 0.130*** 
(0.003) 
0.098*** 
(0.004) 
0.077*** 
(0.003) 
0.068*** 
(0.003) 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
 DC  0.467*** 
(0.024) 
 0.196*** 
(0.021) 
 
 
0.185*** 
(0.025) 
 Income 0.147*** 
(0.007) 
0.140*** 
(0.006) 
0.066*** 
(0.005) 
0.074*** 
(0.005) 
0.085*** 
(0.004) 
0.094*** 
(0.005) 
1997 Distance 0.135*** 
(0.003) 
0.095*** 
(0.003) 
0.079*** 
(0.003) 
0.065*** 
(0.003) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
 DC  0.480*** 
(0.019) 
 0.241*** 
(0.017) 
 
 
0.121*** 
(0.020) 
 Income 0.152*** 
(0.007) 
0.151*** 
(0.006) 
0.076*** 
(0.005) 
0.080*** 
(0.005) 
0.108*** 
(0.005) 
0.113*** 
(0.005) 
1998 Distance 0.106*** 
(0.003) 
0.074*** 
(0.003) 
0.046*** 
(0.002) 
0.040*** 
(0.003) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
 DC  0.384*** 
(0.019) 
 0.107*** 
(0.016) 
 
 
0.073*** 
(0.025) 
 Income 0.119*** 
(0.005) 
0.110*** 
(0.005) 
0.059*** 
(0.004) 
0.060*** 
(0.005) 
0.093*** 
(0.005) 
0.097*** 
(0.005) 
1999 Distance 0.065*** 
(0.003) 
0.046*** 
(0.003) 
0.018*** 
(0.002) 
0.016*** 
(0.002) 
-0.006* 
(0.003) 
-0.005* 
(0.003) 
 DC  0.260*** 
(0.014) 
 0.056*** 
(0.013) 
 0.061** 
(0.027) 
 
2000 
Income 0.116*** 
(0.005) 
0.110*** 
(0.005) 
0.061*** 
(0.004) 
0.062*** 
(0.004) 
0.106*** 
(0.004) 
0.109*** 
(0.005) 
 Distance 0.088*** 
(0.003) 
0.069*** 
(0.003) 
0.037*** 
(0.002) 
0.034*** 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
 DC  0.246*** 
(0.014) 
 0.060*** 
(0.013) 
 
 
0.044** 
(0.021) 
Notes: DC = distribution costs differential. The White heteroscedastic-consistent errors are in parentheses;  
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Recall that crs is percentage arbitrage transaction costs; for simplicity, the mark-ups in r and s 
are assumed to be equal.7 Hence, the right-hand side of (3) and (4) should be supplemented 
with variable Drs = ln((1 – ds)/(1 – dr)), which represents the distribution costs dispersion 
among regions (in the form of the percentage differential). Theoretically, the coefficient on 
this variable must equal 1. However, as a mere proxy is used instead of the true value of Drs, 
the coefficient on it may sufficiently deviate from the theoretical value. Thus, the only thing to 
be expected is the positive sign of the coefficient. 
Since only yearly data on distribution costs are available, other variables are temporally 
aggregated to be yearly ones too. Namely, they are averaged over year. Table 1 sets out 
estimation results without and with taking distribution costs into account. For brevity, the 
income differential is referred to as simply “Income”; Model 1 means specification (4), and 
Model 2 means (4) supplemented with variable Drs(t), t indexing years. 
But for two instances, distribution costs are statistically significant and have the expected 
positive sign. However, the comparison of the integration measure estimates obtained in 
Model 1 and Model 2 suggests that changes in them caused by the inclusion of distribution 
costs are rather small. The coefficients on income in each pair of the models have 
overlapping 95-percent confidence intervals (except for entire Russia in 1995, where this is 
the 90-percent interval), thus indicating that the difference between the coefficients is hardly 
significant. The standard errors of b remain almost the same, and do not change at all 
statistical inference about b. Here from it may be believed that the regressors I and D are 
near to be orthogonal, and that the omission of D biases the estimation of the regression 
variance only slightly. 
Figure 4 provides a pictorial rendition of changes in the integration measure producing by 
taking distribution costs into account.  
                                                 
7 The retail-wholesale margin could capture differences in both distribution costs and mark-ups. However, it does 
not for crude approximation by the proxy mentioned. 
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 Figure 4. "Aggregated" integration trajectories  
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Note: The dashed lines mark the levels of b  obtained without regard for distribution costs. 
The changes in estimation results are reported more fully in appendix Figure A-7. Comparing 
Figure 4 with Figure 2, it is seen that the yearly averaging does not distort the general 
evolution pattern. Losing details, the “aggregated” trajectories retain the main features of the 
evolution of market integration. 
Dealing with entire Russia, the inclusion of distribution costs lowers b, as would be expected. 
But this not always is the case with Russia excluding difficult-to-access regions; beginning in 
1996, b increases in Model 2. The more so, when the case in hand is European Russia; here 
is the only instance of decreasing b. The effect of distribution costs on the coefficient on 
distance is stronger. When the difficult-to-access regions are present in the sample, the 95-
percent (as well as the 90-percent) confidence intervals of g do not overlap. However, they 
do for the other two samples. Values of g always fall with inserting distribution costs (though, 
sometimes remaining unchanged in European Russia). 
Let us turn to the importance of distribution costs as compared to income and distance in 
determining price dispersion, measuring the importance of a variable as the contribution of 
its average value to the average price dispersion. As seen from (2) and (3), the intercept in 
regression (4) is nothing but a scaling multiplier for distance. Hence, the contribution of 
distance is PL /)ˆˆ( g+a ; for the other two variables, it is simply PI /bˆ and PD /dˆ , 
where d is the coefficient on the distribution costs differential. Table 2 reports these 
contributions rounded off to integer percents. (The input data are reported in the appendix; 
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its Table A-3 lists the means of P, I, and D, and Table A-4 lists the estimated intercepts as 
well as mean distances.) 
As figures from Table 2 evidence, the overwhelming share of price dispersion owes its origin 
to distance. Along with this, the economic significance of other impediments to arbitrage 
represented by the effect of income dispersion is high enough. This variable accounts for 10 
to 20% of the average price dispersion (sometimes, even for more). At last, the contribution 
of the distribution costs dispersion is considerable over entire Russia; it markedly falls when 
the difficult-to-access regions are removed from the region sample, and becomes practically 
insignificant in European Russia. Comparing results for Model 1 and those for Model 2, we 
notice that the most share of the distribution costs contribution appears at a sacrifice of 
reducing the distance contribution, while the contribution of the income dispersion is little 
changed. 
The explanation may be the expensiveness of marketing and distribution services in the 
remote, difficult-to-access regions. As distances to them are long too, this causes a 
(spurious?) correlation between distribution costs and distance. To a less degree the same is 
valid for Russia excluding difficult-to-access regions, as there are Siberian and Far-Eastern 
regions in the sample. 
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Thus, the difference in distribution costs is responsible for some share of price dispersion. 
However, in the absence of a relevant variable in the regression, the most portion of its role 
is picked up by the distance variable, so preventing a considerable bias of b. Hence, it is 
possible to dispense with taking distribution costs into account (at least, while analyzing the 
Russian market). Some minor details of the qualitative pattern of the price behavior may be 
lost, but it will essentially be similar.  
Table 2. Contribution of variables to average price dispersion, percent 
Year Variable Entire Russia Excluding difficult-to-access regions European Russia 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
1992 Income 14 NA 7 NA 1 NA 
 Distance 86  93  99  
 Income 21 18 7 7 3 3 
1993 Distance 79 75 93 91 97 97 
 DC  7  2  0 
 Income 32 29 14 14 15 15 
1994 Distance 68 64 86 83 85 85 
 DC  7  3  0 
 Income 27 23 17 16 19 19 
1995 Distance 73 66 83 81 81 81 
 DC  11  3  0 
 Income 20 18 9 9 14 16 
1996 Distance 80 65 91 85 86 83 
 DC  17  6  1 
 Income 19 18 9 10 17 18 
1997 Distance 81 62 91 81 83 83 
 DC  20  9  -1 
 Income 22 22 12 13 20 21 
1998 Distance 78 62 88 83 80 80 
 DC  16  4  -1 
 Income 21 19 10 10 18 18 
1999 Distance 79 69 90 88 82 83 
 DC  12  2  -1 
 Income 20 19 11 11 24 25 
2000 Distance 80 69 89 87 76 75 
 DC  12  2  0 
Note: DC = distribution costs differential. 
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6. A Comparison 
It is interesting to correlate the pattern reported with results obtained with the use of an 
alternative methodology. Berkowitz and DeJong (2001) examined market integration in 
Russia, having used the same sample of 74 regions and the same price index as in this 
study.  
The intuition behind their work is as follows. Price dispersion is assumed to fluctuate within 
bounds dictated by arbitrage transaction costs, -Crs £ Prs(t) £ Crs. Hence, its temporal 
volatility calculated as the standard deviation of Prs(t) over a sub-period t–n,…,t+n, srs(t), 
should be a function of Crs (implicitly assuming Crs to be near-constant during the sub-
period). In turn, if a market is integrated then arbitrage transaction costs are nothing but 
transportation costs; thus, srs(t) should be an increasing function of distance. Basing on this, 
region r is deemed to be integrated during a given sub-period when the coefficient on 
distance in the test regression of srs(t) on Lrs (across s) is positive and statistically significant. 
The extent of market integration is measured as the percentage of integrated regions. 
Shifting t – the median date of the twelve-month sub-period, 2n = 12 – by monthly steps, the 
integration trajectory is obtained.  
Figure 5 provides a comparison of the Berkowitz-DeJong integration trajectory with the 
trajectory for entire Russia from Figure 2 of this paper. The latter is turned over (since b and 
the percentage of integrated regions change in opposite directions with an improvement in 
integration) and is vertically shifted in order to somehow match the trajectories. Certainly, 
they cannot coincide in any case, if for no other reason than the “integration percentage” is 
confined between 0 and 1, while b changes from 0, having no upper bound. Nevertheless, 
the trajectories have much in common. 
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Figure 5. Comparison of integration trajectories with different integration 
measures
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Trajectory by Berkowitz and DeJong (left scale)
Trajectory from this paper (right scale)
 
Roughly, the trajectories are alike in shape, having ups and downs in the same or 
neighboring points in time. With this, it should be noted that that the Berkowitz-DeJong 
trajectory is to some extent ambiguously related to the time scale. First, being the sixth 
month within a twelve-month interval over which the price volatility is calculated, their time 
point is not the exact median date; the seventh month could be equally well taken as a 
representative of the time interval. Second, the integration measure by Berkowitz and 
DeJong picks up the behavior of prices not only at a given point in time, but in its 5-6-month 
neighborhood as well. And this may cause a shift of a captured change in integration – as 
compared with the trajectory of b – in either direction (probably, by one to three months). 
Taking this into account, the trajectories may be thought of as being in good agreement with 
one another. Hence, despite the fact that they are harvests of quite different methodologies, 
both the trajectories provide the similar pattern of integration in the Russian market. 
Besides the cost of the food basket, Berkowitz and DeJong (2001) use one more price 
indicator, namely, a regional consumer price index (CPI). The integration trajectory produced 
by CPI considerably differs from that based on the basket-cost data, indicating less degree 
of integration. There are two possible reasons of this. The first is noted by the authors 
themselves; the case in point is that the general CPI covers services, so distorting dispersion 
of prices for tradable commodities. The second reason is insufficient reliability of the Russian 
regional CPIs. As found by Gluschenko (2001b), they are severely biased with respect to 
spatial price indices, overstating inter-regional differences. That is the reason why absolute 
price of a good basket is favored over CPI in this paper despite much – about 3 times – 
wider coverage of foodstuffs provided by the latter.  
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7. Anatomy of Market Segmentation  
Having found that the Russian market is not near to be completely integrated, even though 
distances and difficult access to a number of regions are controlled for, the question now 
naturally arises of culprits behind this. Berkowitz and DeJong (2001) analyzed the influence 
of political and macroeconomic environment on integration of Russian regional markets. No 
less tempting is to reveal immediate causes of market frictions integrally reflected by the 
integration (or, more precisely, segmentation) measure b. This implies that the dissection of 
bIrs representing unobservable arbitrage transaction costs should be made, so specifying its 
internal texture.  
As noted in Section 2, if one knew building blocks of barriers to arbitrage, the income 
dispersion variable would appear as unneeded. Taken jointly, these blocks would substitute 
it, which manifest itself in reduction of b to zero with insertion them to Equation (4). Intuitively, 
impediments to inter-regional trade in Russia – albeit they are numerous – are rather known; 
they are widely covered in the literature and in the mass media. Among them are: poor 
market infrastructure, fragmentary market structure (described by Ericson (2001) – 
unfortunately, too briefly) and related institutional factors, lack of information on arbitrage 
opportunities, regional protectionism (in particular, administrative barriers to trade, i.e., 
blocking outside supply and forbidding export by regional authorities), state intervention in 
economy, organized crime, etc. The trouble is that all of them are difficult to quantify. For this, 
it succeeded in proxying only a portion of culprits behind market segmentation. These are as 
follows. 
Shipping conditions. Besides transportation costs, conditions of shipping goods can 
impede inter-regional trade, so widening price dispersion. Two variables are adopted to 
proxy this market friction: the quality of region’s transport infrastructure and the regional 
freight tariff. The former is drawn from Matiyasevich et al. (1998). For this variable to change 
in the same direction as the price dispersion, their original index is reversed by subtracting it 
from 1, so that the larger the number, the worse the region’s transport infrastructure; the 
index varies from 0 to 1. (Hence, it actually is the index of infrastructure imperfection.) The 
variable for a pair of regions is constructed as the difference of the indices for these regions. 
Although the data used to calculate the index are dated to 1996, the index is believed to be 
inertial enough, and is expanded over the entire span of time considered. To construct the 
regional freight tariff variable, yearly regional freight-tariff indices from Goskomstat (2000) 
are used. For a given year, the base index is calculated by the chain method, taking 1991 to 
be 1. Thus, this is the level of within-region freight tariff at the end of a year (related to the 
level of 1991). The pair wise variable is the logarithm ratio of such base indices in regions of 
the pair.  
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State intervention in economy. Two variables represent it: price regulations and 
subsidizing. The former is the proportion of goods and services with regulated prices in the 
region in the first quarter of 1996; the data source is Goskomstat (probably, not published). 
The latter is production subsidies as a proportion of the regional budget expenditures in 1995 
by information of RECEP (the initial source is unknown). The relevant pair wise variable is 
the logarithm ratio of regional indicators. The same values are used for the entire time span 
under consideration. It is very probable that these values were changing sufficiently during 
this period. Beyond the years for which the indicat ors were calculated, they are interpreted 
as the proxies of propensity to price regulating and subsidizing production in the region.  
Organized crime. Two proxies of organized crime are available. The first is the total crime 
rate, i.e., the number of registered crimes per 10,000 of the population. The source of 
(yearly) data is Goskomstat (2000). The crime rate variable is the logarithm ratio of indicators 
for regions of a pair. The second proxy describes economic power of crime as the proportion 
of the regional economy controlled by criminal groups in 1995/1996 according to Kakotkin 
(1996). Following Brown and Earle (2000), the relevant regional variable is quantified as 
equaling 1 if criminal groups control more than 50% of the economy, 0.75 if they control 35-
50%, 0.5 if they control 20-35%, and 0.25 if they control less than 20%. The pair wise 
variable is constructed as the difference of these values for the regions belonging to the pair. 
The values are expanded over the entire period. Correlation between these measures of 
organized crime is weak, 0.095 as a maximum; its sign varies across years and region 
samples. This suggests that two proxies of organized crime are far from being simply 
versions of each other. Supposedly, they reflect two different dimensions of organized crime 
(both being merely a rough approximation of it). The activity of criminal groups in legal 
business qualitatively differs from that of ordinary gangs; when occurring here, crimes as 
such are much more latent since they are mainly of economic nature. And so, it does not 
seem that more economic power of crime in a region would necessarily increase the total 
number of crimes. That is why both the variables are contemporaneously included into the 
regressions.  
So there are 6 additional variables approximating market frictions. (In fact, more variables 
were tried, but they appeared to be statistically insignificant in all or most of regressions.) 
Only two of them are time-varying. For this reason (as well as for very crude approximation) 
it would hardly be worthwhile to analyze their temporal impacts. Therefore aggregate 
analysis is implemented, using a (random effects) panel model. However, the direction of 
changes in effect of organized crime on market integration is of specific interest. To identify it, 
the organized crime variables, say Xrs, enter into the panel regressions with trended 
coefficients, (m0 + mt)Xrs, where t is time (t=0 for 1993, t=1 for 1994, etc.), m0 and m are 
parameters to be estimated. In other words, both Xrs and Xrst (referred to as trend or trended 
value in tables below) are included into the panel regressions. Lacking data on some 
variables for 1992 and 2000, the panels cover 1993 through 1999 (with yearly frequency). 
Due to missed observations on additional variables, the cross-sections are shorter in the 
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panels, namely, entire Russia includes 2415 region pairs, Russia excluding difficult-to-access 
regions includes 2145 pairs, and European Russia includes 1128 pairs. 
The results of panel analysis are reported in Table 3. Panel Model A means the panel version 
of cross-sectional Model 2 (see Section 5). Its estimates serve as the benchmark for Panel 
Model B containing additional variables. “Contribution” columns of the table contain percent 
contributions of relevant variables to price dispersion. The contributions are calculated in the 
same manner as those in Table 2. A difference is only in that percents in Table 3 are rounded 
off to the first decimal place in order to preserve small contributions. It is seen from the 
above-described construction of the additional variables that the are relative values that do 
not contribute to the regression intercepts; this becomes quite obvious, if one interprets 
constructing of pairwise variables similarly to going from Equation (1) to Equation (2). Thus 
the intercept again owes its origin solely to the scaling multiplier for distance, and so, it 
should be attributed to the contribution of distance to price dispersion. Extra data used to 
calculate the contributions of variables are set out in appendix Table A -5.  
Table 3. Panel regression results and economic importance of variables 
Variable Entire Russia Excluding difficult-to-access regions 
European Russia 
 Estimate Contribution Estimate Contribution Estimate Contribution 
Panel Model A 
Income 0.105
*** 
(0.003) 13.1 
0.062*** 
(0.003) 7.8 
0.064*** 
(0.004) 8.9 
Distance 0.114
*** 
(0.003) 84.6 
0.061*** 
(0.002) 92.2 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 91.1 
Distribution costs  0.071
*** 
(0.008) 2.3 
0.002 
(0.008) 0.0 
0.010 
(0.014) 0.0 
Panel Model B 
Income dispersion 0.082
*** 
(0.003) 10.2 
0.048*** 
(0.003) 6.1 
0.044*** 
(0.004) 6.2 
Distance 0.106
*** 
(0.003) 77.9 
0.052*** 
(0.002) 82.3 
0.005 
(0.003) 81.8 
Distribution costs  0.097
*** 
(0.008) 3.2 
0.019** 
(0.009) 0.5 
0.015 
(0.014) -0.1 
Transport 
infrastructure 
0.043*** 
(0.007) 1.1 
0.026*** 
(0.006) 0.6 
-0.021*** 
(0.008) 0.5 
Regional freight tariff -0.000 (0.001) 0.0 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 1.1 
0.002** 
(0.001) 0.1 
Price regulations  -0.005
*** 
(0.002) 0.3 
-0.000 
(0.001) 0.0 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 1.0 
Subsidizing -0.017
*** 
(0.008) 1.1 
-0.017*** 
(0.002) 1.5 
-0.020*** 
(0.002) 3.1 
Crime rate 0.164
*** 
(0.004) 13.1 
0.165*** 
(0.003) 16.9 
0.146*** 
(0.004) 12.1 
Its trend -0.043
*** 
(0.001) -8.5 
-0.041*** 
(0.001) -10.3 
-0.024*** 
(0.001) -5.9 
Economic power of 
organized crime 
0.095*** 
(0.004) 4.0 
0.080*** 
(0.004) 3.5 
0.064*** 
(0.004) 3.6 
Its trend -0.019
*** 
(0.001) -2.4 
-0.017*** 
(0.001) -2.2 
-0.013*** 
(0.001) -2.4 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels. A “negative zero” is the result of the three-digit round-up of a negative estimate.  
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The inclusion of variables representing specific market frictions does lead to decrease of b. 
However, b still remains statistically significant. The decrease equals about 30% for Euro-
pean Russia, and about 20% for two other region samples. This would be expected, as the 
list of the present market frictions is far from complete. 
The economic significance of distance grows smaller, too, by 8-10%. (Interestingly, being 
estimated over the 7-year panels, the shares of distance are close to each other across 
region samples regardless of whether specific market frictions are taken into account or are 
not.) At the same time, the contribution of other two variables associated with transportation 
costs – transport infrastructure and freight tariff – does not compensate this decrease. This 
suggests that there are other variables correlated – truly or spuriously – with distance. In 
general, the contribution of the additional transport -related variables to price dispersion is 
little (if any), ranging from 0.6% to 1.7%. The coefficient on transport infrastructure has the 
abnormal negative sign in European Russia. It is the Moscow market that causes this 
phenomenon. When Moscow is excluded from the European Russia sample, the coefficient 
becomes positive, equaling 0.049 with the statistical significance at the 0.1% level. (In doing 
so, distance turns out to be significant, g=0.010, and freight tariff appears to be insignificant.) 
The point is that transport infrastructure is “perfect” in Moscow (it is the only region where the 
transport infrastructure variable has the zero value), while prices are high, hence the reverse 
relationship between these variables. 
As for distribution costs, their contribution to price dispersion, while estimated over panels, is 
minor, if any. Though, the effect of distribution costs becomes more distinct if there are 
variables for specific market frictions in the regressions. 
Turning to state intervention in economy, the most interesting feature is the negative sign of 
estimates of both relevant variables across all region samples. The matter is that prices and, 
say, the extent of price regulations change in opposite directions: the stronger the regula-
tions, the lower prices. On the other hand, the same forces the means of these two variables 
to have opposite signs. As the result, the contributions of price regulations and subsidizing to 
price dispersion turn out to be positive. The total contribution of state intervention in economy 
is about 4% in European Russia and about 1.5% in other two region samples. 
Organized crime is found to be marked market friction. Its contribution to price dispersion is 
6.2% (13.1 – 8.5 + 4.0 - 2.4) in entire Russia, 7.9% in Russia without difficult-to-access 
regions, and 7.4% in European Russia. This is much more than the contribution of any other 
identified market friction (of course, except distance). The panel regressions run without 
trending the organized crime variables yield lesser estimates (significant at the 0.1% level): 
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 Entire Russia Excluding difficult-to-access regions  European Russia 
Crime rate 0.036 0.044 0.027 
Economic power of organized crime 0.038 0.027 0.026 
Total contribution to price dispersion, % 4.3 5.6 3.7 
 
The static way of dealing with the organized crime variables sufficiently reduces values of 
their contributions to price dispersion (by half for European Russia and by a factor of 1.4 for 
the remaining samples). Nevertheless, the contributions still exceed those of other variables.  
The both organized crime variables have statistically significant and negative trends across 
all region samples, so suggesting that the impact of organized crime on integration is 
diminishing with time. To check this, yearly cross-sectional regressions were run for 1993 to 
1999. Their results corroborate the phenomenon, evidencing that the impact of organized 
crime was strengthening during the early years of the transition, and then it was permanently 
weakening; peaks were in 1994 (the crime rate variable) and 1995 (the crime’s economic 
power variable).  
Such a finding seems to be rather surprising. However, analyzing the data of a number of 
sociological surveys, Radayev (1998) finds the same feature in the evolution of crime in 
Russia. He suggests the following reasons for narrowing the “realm of organized force”: the 
ending of the era of “fast money”, the division of spheres of influence, strengthening care (of 
crime and business which uses its “services”) for own security, the shift of crime to “white” 
and “gray” market segments.8 This does not mean that organized crime steps back; it just 
transforms itself, that is, the opposition of crime and business is changing to interosculation. 
About 80% of price dispersion is due to the impact of physical distance. It would be 
conveniently to evaluate the economic importance of market frictions also as their 
contribution to the remaining part of price dispersion. Unidentified market frictions, the impact 
of which is represented by b, account for 46% of it in entire Russia; 28% are due to 
organized crime (19% according to the regression without trend); distribution costs contribute 
14%; and 6% is provided by state intervention in economy. For Russia excluding difficult-to-
access-regions, the unidentified frictions are responsible for 34% of price dispersion; 45% (or 
33%, omitting trends) is due to organized crime; shipping conditions add 9%; and state 
intervention accounts for 8%. At last, in European Russia, the share of unidentified forces is, 
again, 34%; organized crime contributes 41% (or 22%, if there are no trends); and 22% are 
due to price regulations and subsidies. Appendix Figure A-8 illustrates economic significance 
of various market frictions measured relative to both total price dispersion and that less the 
contribution of distance. 
                                                 
8 “The time when risky money, big and fast, was made is over. Nowadays this is a routine, a complex and hard job; 
no superprofit is here, and where it lacks, extortioners do not intrude there”, – cites Radayev (1998), p. 60, his 
respondent. 
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8. Conclusions 
Using data across 74 Russian regions from the very beginning of the price liberalization to 
the recent years, changes in the degree of market integration in Russia during this period are 
evaluated. The pattern obtained is consistent with results by Berkowitz and DeJong (2001) 
who use a quite different methodology. This pattern is rather encouraging. After a period of 
growing disconnectedness, integration of the Russian market tends to improve, though with 
some deviations from this general trend. 
As the dependence of regional prices on local demand still persists, the Russian market 
cannot be deemed as being completely integrated even by now. However, the question of 
how far it is from complete integration remains open. The quantitative results suggest that 
the 1-percent change in local per capita incomes induced 0.05 to 0.1-percent change in price 
dispersion in 2000. But is this much or little? On the other hand, the issue of what degree of 
market integration is really achievable is vague as well. Having no other reference point, one 
is forced to base judgments on the theoretical standard suggesting comparison with the zero 
value of b. But such a comparison may be too severe for the Russian market, overstating its 
shortcomings. 
The point is that there is some evidence that actual economies thought of as being 
integrated do not match this speculative standard as well, in other words, that they are not 
completely integrated. For example, Morgan (1998) estimates the food price dispersion 
across the Euro-zone countries as ranging up to 1.43. Moreover, this pertains equally to the 
US economy. The ACCRA cost-of-living index for the forth quarter 1999 (drawn from 
www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0855786.html) indicates that the cost of groceries varies 1.4-fold 
across US cities, from 0.9 of the national average in San Antonio, Texas, to 1.26 in San 
Diego, California. There is a portion of results by Engel and Rogers (1996) that can be 
interpreted as an indication of the fact that price dispersion across US cities depends on 
local demand like in Russia (Gluschenko, 2002a, discusses this in more detail). 
Hence, to evenly judge to what extent the Russian market is integrated, deviations of b from 
a really achievable value – i.e., peculiar to advanced market economies – should be 
considered rather than deviations from the theoretical standard. Besides that, it is unknown 
whether relatively small fluctuations of the degree of integration (such as in 1999-2000) are a 
feature of the Russian market or they are merely random shocks. And so, it would be very 
helpful to apply the methodology put forward here to an advanced market economy. This 
would provide the realistic benchmark to judge how far the behavior of the Russian economy 
deviates from that of actual market economies. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A-1.   Composition and Structure of the Basket of 25 
Basic Food Goods 
No. Good Unit of 
measure 
Quantity 
1 Rye-and-wheat bread kg 68.7 
2 White bread kg 62.9 
3 Flour kg 19.5 
4 Rice kg 3.7 
5 Millet kg 9.8 
6 Vermicelli kg 5.2 
7 Potatoes kg 124.2 
8 Cabbages kg 28.1 
9 Carrots kg 37.5 
10 Onions kg 28.4 
11 Apples kg 19.4 
12 Sugar kg 20.7 
13 Beef kg 8.4 
14 Poultry-meat kg 17.5 
15 Boiled sausage kg 0.45 
16 Boiled-and-smoked 
sausage 
kg 0.35 
17 Frozen fish kg 11.7 
18 Milk l 123.1 
19 Sour cream kg 1.6 
20 Butter kg 2.5 
21 Curd kg 9.9 
22 Cheese kg 2.3 
23 Eggs piece 151.4 
24 Margarine kg 3.9 
25 Vegetable oil  kg  6.4 
Source: Goskomstat (1996a), p. 428. 
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Table A-2. Estimation Results 
Period Entire Russia Excluding difficult-to-access regions European Russia 
 b  (s.e.) p-value g (s.e.) p-value b  (s.e.) p-value g (s.e.) p-value b  (s.e.) p-value g (s.e.) p-value 
1992:02 0.019 (0.006) 0.004 0.010 (0.003) 0.002 0.010  (0.008) 0.223 0.006  (0.004) 0.070 -0.019 (0.014) 0.171 0.020  (0.006) 0.002 
1992:03 0.094 (0.009) 0.000 0.026 (0.004) 0.000 0.057  (0.009) 0.000 0.001  (0.004) 0.889 0.020 (0.015) 0.191 0.012  (0.007) 0.082 
1992:04 0.111 (0.008) 0.000 0.023 (0.004) 0.000 0.070  (0.008) 0.000 0.013  (0.004) 0.002 0.060 (0.013) 0.000 0.003  (0.007) 0.701 
1992:05 0.112 (0.007) 0.000 0.025 (0.003) 0.000 0.074  (0.008) 0.000 0.016  (0.004) 0.000 0.063 (0.011) 0.000 -0.001  (0.006) 0.838 
1992:06 0.100 (0.006) 0.000 0.032 (0.003) 0.000 0.070  (0.007) 0.000 0.011  (0.003) 0.001 0.067 (0.013) 0.000 0.013  (0.006) 0.027 
1992:07 0.099 (0.005) 0.000 0.008 (0.003) 0.006 0.060  (0.005) 0.000 -0.005  (0.003) 0.128 0.041 (0.010) 0.000 0.021  (0.006) 0.000 
1992:08 0.150 (0.009) 0.000 0.043 (0.004) 0.000 0.066  (0.008) 0.000 0.018  (0.004) 0.000 0.041 (0.013) 0.001 0.022  (0.006) 0.000 
1992:09 0.183 (0.010) 0.000 0.065 (0.005) 0.000 0.085  (0.012) 0.000 0.037  (0.005) 0.000 -0.061 (0.019) 0.002 0.020  (0.007) 0.004 
1992:10 0.201 (0.009) 0.000 0.052 (0.004) 0.000 0.112  (0.009) 0.000 0.021  (0.004) 0.000 0.026 (0.014) 0.066 0.015  (0.007) 0.022 
1992:11 0.171 (0.009) 0.000 0.036 (0.004) 0.000 0.110  (0.009) 0.000 0.013  (0.004) 0.003 0.068 (0.016) 0.000 0.017  (0.007) 0.012 
1992:12 0.186 (0.010) 0.000 0.036 (0.004) 0.000 0.132  (0.011) 0.000 0.013  (0.005) 0.005 0.120 (0.018) 0.000 0.014  (0.008) 0.073 
1993:01 0.077 (0.009) 0.000 0.052 (0.005) 0.000 0.038  (0.010) 0.000 0.038  (0.005) 0.000 -0.034 (0.017) 0.041 0.007  (0.008) 0.372 
1993:02 0.111 (0.009) 0.000 0.044 (0.005) 0.000 0.049  (0.010) 0.000 0.025  (0.005) 0.000 0.024 (0.017) 0.161 0.002  (0.009) 0.797 
1993:03 0.084 (0.009) 0.000 0.026 (0.005) 0.000 0.022  (0.010) 0.029 0.011  (0.005) 0.050 -0.064 (0.019) 0.001 0.019  (0.010) 0.053 
1993:04 0.148 (0.009) 0.000 0.037 (0.004) 0.000 0.077  (0.010) 0.000 0.021  (0.004) 0.000 0.065 (0.017) 0.000 0.014  (0.007) 0.050 
1993:05 0.127 (0.008) 0.000 0.049 (0.004) 0.000 0.054  (0.008) 0.000 0.029  (0.004) 0.000 0.022 (0.015) 0.153 0.022  (0.007) 0.001 
1993:06 0.219 (0.010) 0.000 0.065 (0.004) 0.000 0.103  (0.008) 0.000 0.036  (0.004) 0.000 0.106 (0.015) 0.000 0.014  (0.007) 0.027 
1993:07 0.224 (0.011) 0.000 0.078 (0.005) 0.000 0.087  (0.011) 0.000 0.040  (0.005) 0.000 0.103 (0.019) 0.000 0.008  (0.008) 0.316 
1993:08 0.316 (0.011) 0.000 0.102 (0.004) 0.000 0.166  (0.010) 0.000 0.068  (0.004) 0.000 0.157 (0.014) 0.000 0.015  (0.005) 0.005 
1993:09 0.256 (0.010) 0.000 0.096 (0.004) 0.000 0.124  (0.009) 0.000 0.064  (0.004) 0.000 0.083 (0.011) 0.000 0.010  (0.005) 0.068 
1993:10 0.294 (0.012) 0.000 0.114 (0.004) 0.000 0.146  (0.010) 0.000 0.077  (0.004) 0.000 0.092 (0.013) 0.000 0.008  (0.005) 0.135 
1993:11 0.302 (0.011) 0.000 0.116 (0.004) 0.000 0.176  (0.010) 0.000 0.077  (0.004) 0.000 0.108 (0.014) 0.000 0.017  (0.005) 0.002 
1993:12 0.208 (0.011) 0.000 0.107 (0.004) 0.000 0.106  (0.010) 0.000 0.078  (0.004) 0.000 0.062 (0.015) 0.000 0.027  (0.006) 0.000 
1994:01 0.178 (0.009) 0.000 0.119 (0.004) 0.000 0.092  (0.008) 0.000 0.085  (0.004) 0.000 0.067 (0.012) 0.000 0.022  (0.006) 0.001 
1994:02 0.223 (0.009) 0.000 0.101 (0.004) 0.000 0.120  (0.009) 0.000 0.075  (0.004) 0.000 0.132 (0.013) 0.000 0.019  (0.006) 0.001 
1994:03 0.217 (0.010) 0.000 0.102 (0.004) 0.000 0.108  (0.008) 0.000 0.068  (0.004) 0.000 0.089 (0.011) 0.000 0.017  (0.005) 0.001 
1994:04 0.251 (0.011) 0.000 0.135 (0.005) 0.000 0.103  (0.008) 0.000 0.076  (0.004) 0.000 0.098 (0.012) 0.000 0.006  (0.006) 0.288 
1994:05 0.229 (0.010) 0.000 0.113 (0.004) 0.000 0.077  (0.006) 0.000 0.063  (0.004) 0.000 0.097 (0.009) 0.000 0.032  (0.005) 0.000 
1994:06 0.232 (0.010) 0.000 0.106 (0.004) 0.000 0.075  (0.005) 0.000 0.046  (0.003) 0.000 0.069 (0.007) 0.000 -0.003  (0.004) 0.531 
1994:07 0.229 (0.009) 0.000 0.112 (0.005) 0.000 0.102  (0.007) 0.000 0.060  (0.004) 0.000 0.100 (0.009) 0.000 0.052  (0.006) 0.000 
1994:08 0.313 (0.010) 0.000 0.135 (0.004) 0.000 0.147  (0.008) 0.000 0.087  (0.004) 0.000 0.151 (0.009) 0.000 0.031  (0.005) 0.000 
1994:09 0.296 (0.009) 0.000 0.145 (0.004) 0.000 0.159  (0.007) 0.000 0.097  (0.003) 0.000 0.143 (0.007) 0.000 0.025  (0.004) 0.000 
1994:10 0.282 (0.009) 0.000 0.139 (0.004) 0.000 0.147  (0.007) 0.000 0.088  (0.004) 0.000 0.141 (0.008) 0.000 0.026  (0.004) 0.000 
1994:11 0.285 (0.009) 0.000 0.121 (0.004) 0.000 0.149  (0.007) 0.000 0.071  (0.004) 0.000 0.143 (0.009) 0.000 0.028  (0.005) 0.000 
1994:12 0.252 (0.008) 0.000 0.099 (0.004) 0.000 0.148  (0.007) 0.000 0.060  (0.004) 0.000 0.150 (0.009) 0.000 0.028  (0.005) 0.000 
1995:01 0.171 (0.007) 0.000 0.096 (0.004) 0.000 0.101  (0.006) 0.000 0.056  (0.004) 0.000 0.095 (0.008) 0.000 0.037  (0.005) 0.000 
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Cont. Table A-2. Estimation Results 
Period Entire Russia Excluding difficult-to-access regions  European Russia 
 b (s.e.) p-value g (s.e.) p-value b (s.e.) p-value g (s.e.) p-value b (s.e.) p-value g (s.e.) p-value 
1995:02 0.176 (0.007) 0.000 0.111 (0.004) 0.000 0.113 (0.007) 0.000 0.076 (0.004) 0.000 0.104 (0.009) 0.000 0.029 (0.005) 0.000 
1995:03 0.171 (0.006) 0.000 0.118 (0.003) 0.000 0.117 (0.005) 0.000 0.081 (0.003) 0.000 0.118 (0.006) 0.000 0.016 (0.004) 0.000 
1995:04 0.180 (0.006) 0.000 0.112 (0.003) 0.000 0.124 (0.005) 0.000 0.078 (0.003) 0.000 0.120 (0.006) 0.000 0.014 (0.004) 0.000 
1995:05 0.166 (0.006) 0.000 0.101 (0.003) 0.000 0.109 (0.006) 0.000 0.066 (0.003) 0.000 0.105 (0.008) 0.000 0.017 (0.005) 0.000 
1995:06 0.173 (0.006) 0.000 0.086 (0.003) 0.000 0.112 (0.006) 0.000 0.051 (0.003) 0.000 0.092 (0.008) 0.000 0.009 (0.004) 0.027 
1995:07 0.209 (0.007) 0.000 0.102 (0.003) 0.000 0.145 (0.006) 0.000 0.075 (0.003) 0.000 0.158 (0.007) 0.000 0.018 (0.004) 0.000 
1995:08 0.231 (0.008) 0.000 0.119 (0.003) 0.000 0.139 (0.006) 0.000 0.083 (0.003) 0.000 0.156 (0.007) 0.000 0.012 (0.004) 0.002 
1995:09 0.222 (0.008) 0.000 0.119 (0.003) 0.000 0.130 (0.006) 0.000 0.084 (0.003) 0.000 0.147 (0.007) 0.000 0.013 (0.004) 0.000 
1995:10 0.210 (0.008) 0.000 0.114 (0.003) 0.000 0.114 (0.006) 0.000 0.073 (0.003) 0.000 0.130 (0.008) 0.000 0.011  (0.004) 0.005 
1995:11 0.201 (0.008) 0.000 0.114 (0.003) 0.000 0.108 (0.006) 0.000 0.066 (0.003) 0.000 0.125 (0.007) 0.000 0.006 (0.004) 0.134 
1995:12 0.161 (0.007) 0.000 0.115 (0.003) 0.000 0.084 (0.006) 0.000 0.067 (0.003) 0.000 0.096 (0.006) 0.000 0.007 (0.004) 0.078 
1996:01 0.134 (0.007) 0.000 0.134 (0.004) 0.000 0.053 (0.006) 0.000 0.077 (0.003) 0.000 0.071 (0.007) 0.000 0.012 (0.004) 0.005 
1996:02 0.135 (0.007) 0.000 0.132 (0.004) 0.000 0.058 (0.006) 0.000 0.078 (0.003) 0.000 0.077 (0.006) 0.000 0.013 (0.004) 0.001 
1996:03 0.165 (0.008) 0.000 0.132 (0.004) 0.000 0.082 (0.006) 0.000 0.081 (0.003) 0.000 0.089 (0.006) 0.000 0.006 (0.004) 0.078 
1996:04 0.166 (0.008) 0.000 0.133 (0.004) 0.000 0.073 (0.006) 0.000 0.074 (0.003) 0.000 0.093 (0.006) 0.000 0.009 (0.003) 0.008 
1996:05 0.127 (0.008) 0.000 0.134 (0.004) 0.000 0.045 (0.005) 0.000 0.076 (0.003) 0.000 0.068 (0.005) 0.000 0.010 (0.003) 0.004 
1996:06 0.181 (0.009) 0.000 0.130 (0.004) 0.000 0.076 (0.006) 0.000 0.077 (0.003) 0.000 0.102 (0.006) 0.000 0.006 (0.003) 0.089 
1996:07 0.165 (0.008) 0.000 0.135 (0.004) 0.000 0.067 (0.006) 0.000 0.078 (0.003) 0.000 0.113 (0.006) 0.000 0.015 (0.003) 0.000 
1996:08 0.178 (0.007) 0.000 0.126 (0.003) 0.000 0.074 (0.005) 0.000 0.075 (0.003) 0.000 0.095 (0.005) 0.000 0.015 (0.003) 0.000 
1996:09 0.153 (0.007) 0.000 0.126 (0.003) 0.000 0.066 (0.005) 0.000 0.057 (0.003) 0.000 0.079 (0.005) 0.000 0.013 (0.003) 0.000 
1996:10 0.146 (0.007) 0.000 0.128 (0.003) 0.000 0.067 (0.005) 0.000 0.071 (0.003) 0.000 0.082 (0.005) 0.000 0.008 (0.003) 0.016 
1996:11 0.153 (0.007) 0.000 0.136 (0.003) 0.000 0.066 (0.005) 0.000 0.081 (0.003) 0.000 0.091 (0.005) 0.000 0.008 (0.003) 0.011 
1996:12 0.100 (0.007) 0.000 0.128 (0.004) 0.000 0.069 (0.005) 0.000 0.086 (0.003) 0.000 0.091 (0.005) 0.000 0.004 (0.003) 0.140 
1997:01 0.120 (0.006) 0.000 0.142 (0.004) 0.000 0.054 (0.004) 0.000 0.084 (0.003) 0.000 0.061 (0.004) 0.000 0.007 (0.002) 0.004 
1997:02 0.111 (0.007) 0.000 0.142 (0.004) 0.000 0.052 (0.004) 0.000 0.082 (0.003) 0.000 0.055 (0.004) 0.000 0.009 (0.002) 0.001 
1997:03 0.126 (0.007) 0.000 0.141 (0.004) 0.000 0.058 (0.004) 0.000 0.084 (0.003) 0.000 0.066 (0.004) 0.000 0.007 (0.002) 0.008 
1997:04 0.118 (0.007) 0.000 0.151 (0.004) 0.000 0.054 (0.005) 0.000 0.096 (0.003) 0.000 0.069 (0.004) 0.000 0.008 (0.002) 0.002 
1997:05 0.119 (0.007) 0.000 0.139 (0.004) 0.000 0.047 (0.005) 0.000 0.076 (0.003) 0.000 0.065 (0.004) 0.000 0.006 (0.002) 0.021 
1997:06 0.134 (0.007) 0.000 0.133 (0.004) 0.000 0.056 (0.005) 0.000 0.070 (0.003) 0.000 0.069 (0.005) 0.000 0.007 (0.003) 0.009 
1997:07 0.125 (0.007) 0.000 0.140 (0.004) 0.000 0.057 (0.005) 0.000 0.083 (0.003) 0.000 0.078 (0.004) 0.000 -0.002 (0.003) 0.422 
1997:08 0.183 (0.007) 0.000 0.132 (0.003) 0.000 0.089 (0.005) 0.000 0.075 (0.003) 0.000 0.117 (0.004) 0.000 0.006 (0.002) 0.009 
1997:09 0.158 (0.007) 0.000 0.128 (0.003) 0.000 0.075 (0.005) 0.000 0.068 (0.003) 0.000 0.093 (0.005) 0.000 0.010 (0.002) 0.000 
1997:10 0.165 (0.007) 0.000 0.123 (0.003) 0.000 0.074 (0.005) 0.000 0.067 (0.003) 0.000 0.090 (0.006) 0.000 0.013 (0.003) 0.000 
1997:11 0.151 (0.007) 0.000 0.131 (0.003) 0.000 0.057 (0.005) 0.000 0.072 (0.003) 0.000 0.089 (0.005) 0.000 0.011  (0.003) 0.000 
1997:12 0.175 (0.007) 0.000 0.110 (0.003) 0.000 0.073 (0.005) 0.000 0.066 (0.003) 0.000 0.080 (0.005) 0.000 0.013 (0.003) 0.000 
1998:01 0.153 (0.007) 0.000 0.131 (0.003) 0.000 0.069 (0.005) 0.000 0.070 (0.003) 0.000 0.090 (0.005) 0.000 0.010 (0.003) 0.000 
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Cont. Table A-2. Estimation Results 
Period Entire Russia Excluding difficult-to-access regions European Russia 
 b  (s.e.) p-value g (s.e.) p-value b  (s.e.) p-value g (s.e.) p-value b  (s.e.) p-value g (s.e.) p-value 
1998:02 0.131 (0.007) 0.000 0.124  (0.004) 0.000 0.054 (0.005) 0.000 0.058 (0.003) 0.000 0.072 (0.006) 0.000 0.012 (0.003) 0.000 
1998:03 0.134 (0.007) 0.000 0.119  (0.003) 0.000 0.055 (0.005) 0.000 0.057 (0.003) 0.000 0.084 (0.006) 0.000 0.008 (0.003) 0.003 
1998:04 0.138 (0.006) 0.000 0.125  (0.003) 0.000 0.060 (0.005) 0.000 0.063 (0.003) 0.000 0.096 (0.005) 0.000 0.010 (0.002) 0.000 
1998:05 0.137 (0.006) 0.000 0.122  (0.003) 0.000 0.065 (0.005) 0.000 0.062 (0.003) 0.000 0.091 (0.005) 0.000 0.013 (0.002) 0.000 
1998:06 0.143 (0.006) 0.000 0.112  (0.003) 0.000 0.068 (0.005) 0.000 0.052 (0.003) 0.000 0.092 (0.005) 0.000 0.014 (0.003) 0.000 
1998:07 0.154 (0.006) 0.000 0.103  (0.003) 0.000 0.077 (0.005) 0.000 0.039 (0.002) 0.000 0.106 (0.005) 0.000 0.007 (0.003) 0.020 
1998:08 0.156 (0.006) 0.000 0.096  (0.003) 0.000 0.087 (0.005) 0.000 0.029 (0.002) 0.000 0.111 (0.006) 0.000 0.009 (0.003) 0.003 
1998:09 0.151 (0.006) 0.000 0.090  (0.004) 0.000 0.100 (0.005) 0.000 0.029 (0.003) 0.000 0.128 (0.006) 0.000 0.027 (0.005) 0.000 
1998:10 0.148 (0.006) 0.000 0.096  (0.004) 0.000 0.075 (0.005) 0.000 0.031 (0.003) 0.000 0.098 (0.006) 0.000 0.018 (0.004) 0.000 
1998:11 0.140 (0.006) 0.000 0.092  (0.003) 0.000 0.074 (0.005) 0.000 0.039 (0.003) 0.000 0.099 (0.005) 0.000 0.006 (0.003) 0.083 
1998:12 0.126 (0.005) 0.000 0.069  (0.002) 0.000 0.072 (0.005) 0.000 0.039 (0.003) 0.000 0.095 (0.006) 0.000 -0.003 (0.003) 0.383 
1999:01 0.102 (0.005) 0.000 0.077  (0.003) 0.000 0.055 (0.004) 0.000 0.034 (0.002) 0.000 0.078 (0.005) 0.000 -0.001 (0.003) 0.812 
1999:02 0.111 (0.005) 0.000 0.065  (0.003) 0.000 0.056 (0.004) 0.000 0.019 (0.002) 0.000 0.072 (0.005) 0.000 -0.006 (0.003) 0.049 
1999:03 0.122 (0.005) 0.000 0.062  (0.003) 0.000 0.061 (0.004) 0.000 0.017 (0.002) 0.000 0.090 (0.006) 0.000 -0.007 (0.003) 0.020 
1999:04 0.111 (0.005) 0.000 0.062  (0.003) 0.000 0.050 (0.004) 0.000 0.016 (0.002) 0.000 0.074 (0.005) 0.000 -0.003 (0.003) 0.318 
1999:05 0.107 (0.004) 0.000 0.046  (0.003) 0.000 0.056 (0.004) 0.000 0.005 (0.002) 0.014 0.085 (0.005) 0.000 0.000 (0.003) 0.962 
1999:06 0.102 (0.004) 0.000 0.042  (0.002) 0.000 0.053 (0.003) 0.000 0.004 (0.002) 0.035 0.078 (0.005) 0.000 -0.003 (0.003) 0.371 
1999:07 0.102 (0.005) 0.000 0.057  (0.003) 0.000 0.053 (0.004) 0.000 0.016 (0.002) 0.000 0.096 (0.006) 0.000 0.007 (0.003) 0.046 
1999:08 0.132 (0.006) 0.000 0.073  (0.003) 0.000 0.064 (0.005) 0.000 0.018 (0.002) 0.000 0.101 (0.007) 0.000 -0.001 (0.004) 0.707 
1999:09 0.106 (0.005) 0.000 0.071  (0.003) 0.000 0.049 (0.005) 0.000 0.019 (0.002) 0.000 0.080 (0.006) 0.000 0.001 (0.003) 0.647 
1999:10 0.115 (0.005) 0.000 0.074  (0.003) 0.000 0.053 (0.005) 0.000 0.021 (0.002) 0.000 0.080 (0.006) 0.000 0.003 (0.003) 0.295 
1999:11 0.110 (0.005) 0.000 0.073  (0.003) 0.000 0.051 (0.005) 0.000 0.024 (0.002) 0.000 0.081 (0.006) 0.000 0.000 (0.003) 0.909 
1999:12 0.132 (0.005) 0.000 0.074  (0.003) 0.000 0.067 (0.005) 0.000 0.026 (0.002) 0.000 0.105 (0.005) 0.000 -0.004 (0.003) 0.153 
2000:01 0.105 (0.005) 0.000 0.085  (0.003) 0.000 0.053 (0.005) 0.000 0.035 (0.003) 0.000 0.086 (0.006) 0.000 0.002 (0.003) 0.454 
2000:02 0.117 (0.005) 0.000 0.084  (0.003) 0.000 0.059 (0.005) 0.000 0.036 (0.002) 0.000 0.098 (0.005) 0.000 0.001 (0.003) 0.647 
2000:03 0.111 (0.005) 0.000 0.085  (0.003) 0.000 0.054 (0.005) 0.000 0.035 (0.003) 0.000 0.096 (0.006) 0.000 0.001 (0.003) 0.771 
2000:04 0.117 (0.005) 0.000 0.086  (0.003) 0.000 0.061 (0.005) 0.000 0.034 (0.002) 0.000 0.107 (0.005) 0.000 -0.001 (0.003) 0.769 
2000:05 0.105 (0.005) 0.000 0.084  (0.003) 0.000 0.053 (0.004) 0.000 0.034 (0.002) 0.000 0.096 (0.005) 0.000 -0.001 (0.003) 0.748 
2000:06 0.109 (0.005) 0.000 0.080  (0.003) 0.000 0.053 (0.004) 0.000 0.032 (0.002) 0.000 0.094 (0.004) 0.000 -0.001 (0.002) 0.766 
2000:07 0.116 (0.005) 0.000 0.079  (0.003) 0.000 0.064 (0.004) 0.000 0.028 (0.002) 0.000 0.108 (0.005) 0.000 0.013 (0.003) 0.000 
2000:08 0.113 (0.005) 0.000 0.091  (0.003) 0.000 0.061 (0.004) 0.000 0.035 (0.002) 0.000 0.106 (0.005) 0.000 0.008 (0.003) 0.008 
2000:09 0.109 (0.005) 0.000 0.090  (0.003) 0.000 0.060 (0.004) 0.000 0.037 (0.003) 0.000 0.098 (0.005) 0.000 0.005 (0.003) 0.083 
2000:10 0.119 (0.005) 0.000 0.091  (0.003) 0.000 0.064 (0.005) 0.000 0.040 (0.003) 0.000 0.103 (0.005) 0.000 0.004 (0.003) 0.105 
2000:11 0.110 (0.005) 0.000 0.097  (0.003) 0.000 0.063 (0.004) 0.000 0.046 (0.003) 0.000 0.099 (0.004) 0.000 0.002 (0.003) 0.397 
2000:12 0.107 (0.005) 0.000 0.094  (0.003) 0.000 0.058 (0.004) 0.000 0.046 (0.003) 0.000 0.103 (0.004) 0.000 0.003 (0.003) 0.287 
Note: The White heteroscedastic-consistent errors are in parentheses. 
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Table A-3. Means of variables 
Year Entire Russia Excluding difficult-to-
access regions 
European Russia 
 P  I  D  P  I  D  P  I  D  
1992 0.207 0.227 NA 0.179 0.150 NA 0.170 0.068 NA 
1993 0.253 0.264 0.050 0.203 0.171 0.026 0.168 0.077 -0.002 
1994 0.274 0.326 0.073 0.200 0.233 0.040 0.147 0.172 -0.002 
1995 0.239 0.320 0.054 0.185 0.246 0.026 0.130 0.188 -0.011 
1996 0.225 0.277 0.081 0.162 0.201 0.051 0.104 0.152 0.004 
1997 0.204 0.263 0.086 0.143 0.195 0.056 0.082 0.161 -0.006 
1998 0.191 0.281 0.078 0.132 0.214 0.047 0.102 0.186 -0.012 
1999 0.150 0.261 0.069 0.106 0.187 0.036 0.094 0.177 -0.008 
2000 0.157 0.265 0.075 0.110 0.200 0.043 0.088 0.203 -0.006 
 
Table A-4. Estimated intercept a(t) and the mean of distance 
Year Entire Russia Excluding difficult-to-access regions European Russia 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
1992 -0.070  0.069  0.066  
1993 -0.393 -0.300 -0.189 -0.169 0.094 0.100 
1994 -0.760 -0.664 -0.413 -0.379 -0.047 -0.045 
1995 -0.676 -0.462 -0.397 -0.340 0.014 0.013 
1996 -0.822 -0.611 -0.431 -0.375 0.035 0.042 
1997 -0.874 -0.607 -0.465 -0.374 0.012 0.015 
1998 -0.669 -0.451 -0.231 -0.192 0.035 0.038 
1999 -0.384 -0.253 -0.043 -0.027 0.116 0.115 
2000 -0.552 -0.424 -0.182 -0.164 0.071 0.071 
L  7.721 7.550 7.027 
 
Table A-5. The 1993-1999 panel means 
Variable Entire Russia Excluding difficult-to-access regions European Russia 
Price dispersion 0.221 0.165 0.122 
Income dispersion 0.276 0.208 0.170 
Distance 7.717 7.549 7.001 
Distribution costs  0.072 0.042 -0.004 
Transport infrastructure 0.056 0.039 -0.028 
Regional freight tariff 0.285 0.308 0.071 
Price regulations  -0.154 -0.119 -0.149 
Subsidizing -0.147 -0.143 -0.183 
Crime rate 0.175 0.170 0.102 
Its trended value 0.433 0.415 0.193 
Economic power of organized 
crime 0.093 0.072 0.068 
Its trended value 0.282 0.220 0.219 
Intercept, Panel Model A -0.695 -0.309 0.038 
Intercept, Panel Model B -0.650 -0.257 0.066 
Number of observations  16905 15015 7896 
Note: Trended value of variable X implies X×t., where t is year (0, 1,…,6). 
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Figure A-1. Standard deviations of the income differential
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Figure A-2. Estimatres of the coefficient on distance
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Figure A-3. The R squared statistic in the regressions reported 
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Figure A-4. Integration trajectories vs. infation and the $/rub. rate
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Figure A-5. Impact of the Moscow market
(a) on the integration measure
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(b) on the coefficient on distance
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Figure A-6. Imact of filling the data gaps on integration trajectories
(a) Russia excluding difficult-to-access regions
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(b) European Russia
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Figure A-7. Impact of the distribution costs variable on estimation results
(a) Entire Russia
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(b) Russia excluding difficult-to-access regions
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(c) European Russia
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Figure A-8. Contributions of variables to:
(a) total price dispersion
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(b) price dispersion less the distance contribution
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